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The belief that ‘homeopathy works’, is effective and can demonstrate clinical efficacy, while 
encouraging, has little to do with the philosophy, practice or relevance of phenomenology 
to homeopathy. Jeremy Swayne’s editorial draws a spurious link between positive outcome 
studies and the capacity for homeopathy to ‘open up a rich vein of scientific enquiry and 
clinical opportunity’ (Swayne 2013). So too, Tom Whitmarsh’s understanding of 
phenomenology suggests that homeopathy and phenomenology are ‘pretty similar’ in terms 
of how they look at the world (Whitmarsh 2013). As long as the homeopath remains 
‘untainted by what he knows’ and is ‘doing (his) best to avoid received opinion’ 
phenomenology is made to appear logical and easily applied in practice. Together, Swayne’s 
and Whitmarsh’s understanding diminish the complexity of phenomenology as a research 
methodology and as a method of clinical engagement. Their understanding misconstrues 
phenomenology as being ‘purely descriptive,’ ignoring the prospect that description and 
observation are actually based upon interpretation of patient phenomena, not objective 
and unprejudiced observations.  
Reiterating the rhetoric of aphorisms 6 and 83 (Hahnemann 1982 translation of 1810 1st 
edition), Swayne’s and Whitmarsh’s perspective perpetuates the myth of the unprejudiced 
observer. This myth demonstrates that homeopathic case taking can be misconstrued with 
the philosophy and practice of phenomenology. I suggest that hermeneutic 
phenomenology, a branch of phenomenology, is a more suitable method of 
phenomenological investigation, one that acknowledges that the observer (or homeopath) 
is not detached and can never remain unprejudiced regarding the patient and the 
homeopathic process. Rather than this being problematic, however, it requires that the 
observer-homeopath recognise that all preconceived knowledge, empirical experience and 
beliefs together shape their interpretation and understanding of the patient’s lived 
experience. The assumption that phenomenology and homeopathy are therefore naturally 
and conveniently oriented to one another misconstrues phenomenology. It also perpetuates 
a popular myth etched into the homeopathic psyche since Hahnemann’s time. It is time we 
abandoned this false rhetoric. 
The idea in aphorism 6, that the unprejudiced observer need only note what is felt by the 
patient, perceived by those around the patient and observed by the homeopath, diminishes 
the subjectivity of all participants, in particular the homeopathic observer. An experienced 
homeopath (doctor, nurse and so forth) may be an astute observer, but he can never be 
distanced from his subjectivity. Rather, acknowledging our subjectivity enables us to 
recognise that every observation is an interpretative or hermeneutic act (Van Manen 1997 ; 
Svenaeus 2000). Hermeneutics, originally a method of interpreting biblical texts, was 
developed into hermeneutic phenomenology by Martin Heidegger, departing from Husserl. 
Heidegger theorised that experience can never be bracketed, and that phenomenology is 
necessarily hermeneutic when its method becomes interpretative, which is very much the 
case in healthcare interaction (Leonard 1989). Hans Georg Gadamer later asserted that 
phenomenology is inherently interpretative, human experience being bound in the 
subjectivity of narrative language (Gadamer 1975). Consequently, exploring the 
phenomenon of observing a large, white covered object with Dr Mangialavori, Whitmarsh 
acknowledges the multiple descriptions made by 50 homeopaths from diverse positions in 
the space. Yet he fails to recognise that each description is actually an interpretation of the 
phenomenon, and each retelling a reinterpretation. Central to this distinction is the 
hermeneutic notion that observation and description are both acts of subjective 
interpretation; they can never be acts of pure observation. This is the case with 
homeopathy, in which every perception and understanding of the salient characteristics of 
the patient and her lived illness experience demand both overt and subtle interpretation.  
Being an interpretive discipline, homeopaths construct individual interpretations of lived 
illness experiences. How can such interpretations be objective and unprejudiced? “No one, 
when they reason, can be absolutely certain that their conclusions have been derived free 
from the workings of habit, assumptions, prejudice, cultural limitations, or, for that matter, 
intuition” (Barcan 2009). Homeopaths, while demonstrating the capacity to engage deeply 
with patients, with their lived experiences and with the homeopathic process (Eyles, Leydon 
et al. 2012) are constrained by the culture of homeopathy, no more so than by the myth of 
unprejudiced observation. Recognising this myth, homeopathy has the capacity to liberate 
itself from the delusion of the objective gaze, in order to engage authentically and 
coherently with the patient’s lived experience and with phenomenology.  
Swayne and Whitmarsh rightly acknowledge that homeopathy and phenomenology share 
some common ground. Phenomenology, however, is much more than a methodology for 
describing, ordering and exploring reality (Swayne 2013). Rather, suitably applied, 
phenomenology and its many variants, including hermeneutic phenomenology, has the 
capacity to reveal multiple constructions of illness rather than one reductive reality. The 
phenomenological construction of illness experience will be clinically harnessed by 
homeopathy when it accepts that unprejudiced observation is a fallacy. 
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